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I . Introduct ion
Nothing very interesting seems to go on in the equity condition of inequity 
experiments. Such experiments are largely concerned with reactions to inequity. 
Equity theories^ typically assume that there are no reactions to equity if 
outcomes are proportional to inputs, hence there are no fruitful questions to ask 
about equity. The present paper describes the results of a fairly typical equity 
experiment concerned with revolutionary coalitions^, i.e. coalitions of indivi­
dually less powerful members of a group who combine their resources for the 
purpose of reallocating resources and rewards. It departs from the typical 
revolutionary-coalitions experiment only in focusing on the equity rather 
than the inequity condition.
Our experiment manipulated equity by informing S's in a centralized communi­
cation network that the person in the central position, who was the only member 
of the group with an opportunity to win a a sizeable bonus, had exceptional 
ability at the task. It was found, as other such experiments have found, that 
this manipulation produced significantly fewer revolutionary coalitions than an 
inequity condition.
Routine checks on the success with which the independent variables were 
manipulated showed that we did not produce beliefs in individual S's that the 
differential opportunity for rewards was equitable. This essentially means that 
the result produced by the experiment is what Bachrach and Baratz (1962, 1963,
1970) call a "nondecision," i.e. a suppressed issue. The question with which the 
paper is concerned is therefore: Why did S's in the "equity" condition not make an 
issue of an inequity perceived at the individual level? We believe the answer to 
the question will shed some light on an important feature of legitimacy as a 
factor in collective action.
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II. Statement of the Problem
The reason why equity theories do not find questions about equity itself 
fruitful is that they tacitly assume that the meaning of "inputs," "outcomes," 
and "proportionality" are given in the nature of things. They take them for 
granted without questioning how they come to be defined as inputs, outcomes, and 
proportional. Equity is therefore an inert state, a system at rest, in which 
nothing much seems to be going on.
But inputs, outcomes, and proportionality are not self-evident. The central 
idea of any kind of equity theory (and this holds also for status value theories, or 
any other possible theory of justice) is that similar contributions ought to be 
similarly rewarded. But in itself this is not very useful empirically. What has 
to be given is the precise features of the similarity relation (Cf Goode, 1978,
Ch. 13). But these are quite arbitrary social products, depending on how 
states intrinsically given in nature (which tend to shade off into infinite 
variety) are grouped and related by social usage. In our view, task-outcomes, 
inputs, reward-outcomes, and proportionality are all intrinsically indeterminate.
Hence, they are somehow "constructed" objects and relations. The question to ask 
about "equity" therefore is how equity is constructed.
We do not propose to answer this question in any very general way. In some 
sense we give the quite obvious answer that "equity" is "socially" constructed. But the 
case that we consider in this paper is concerned only with the conditions under 
which collective action emerges, i.e. the case in which a revolutionary coalition 
is necessary (and sufficient) to create or maintain equity. The problem for the 
actor(s) in this case is whether to join in collective action with others and to 
mobilize the resources of the members for the pursuit of joint goals.
The mobilization of coalitions is problematic. Individuals will often 
prefer other tactics to restore equity, particularly those not requiring reliance
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on allies. Even when coalition formation is the only reasonable tactic, indivi­
duals sometimes prefer to do nothing rather than form an alliance. (See Michener 
and Lawler, 1971; Michener and Lyons, 1972; Lawler, 1975.) Hence, it does not 
follow from the existence of a common interest in "equity" between two actors that 
they will coalesce.
Under what conditions, then, does collective action in the interest of "equity" 
emerge? Both the natural and the experimental literature support the idea that, 
as Michener puts it, revolutionary coalitions are the interactive product (in the statis 
tical sense) of individual-level discontent and organizational factors. Organizational 
factors here refer to organizational capacities— existing levels of solidarity 
and communication, conditions of assembly, etc.— and inter-group power-dependence 
relations, having to do with the strength of a coalition relative to that of a 
target (e.g. the state) and the readiness on both sides to use this strength.
Both of these organizational factors (as well as the individual-level social 
psychology with which they interact) depend, in turn, in part on moral factors,
i.e. "legitimation". In the experimental literature, where it is easier to 
disentangle what is going on, the idea that inequity is something more than just 
relative deprivation is strongly supported: It is the unfairness, or illegitimacy, 
of a system that promotes revolutionary coalitions (cf. Hoffman, Festinger, and 
Lawrence, 1954; Lawler, 1975; Webster and Smith, 1978). Moral justification is a 
factor both in organizational capacity and relative strength of a coalition. What 
"equity" does for organizational capacity is create legitimacy: It defines 
existing systems as wrong, actions against the system as right. This becomes the 
foundation of a revolutionary coalition's claims on the resources of its members, 
on which its organizational capacity (in part) depends. It does not affect the 
given resources of individual members, but it does affect both the capacity of 
the collective to mobilize these resources and its readiness to use them. Hence
it is also important to inter-group power-dependence relations. The study of 
naturally occurring revolutionary coalitions supports the same conclusion: 
legitimacy increases the strength and readiness of revolutionary coalitions to 
act and decreases the readiness of targets like the state to use forceful methods 
of social control.3
Over and above effects on organizational capacity, the strength of a 
coalition, and the strength of the state, legitimacy is also an important 
factor affecting exogenous resources available to revolutionary coalitions.
Leites and Wolf (1970) and McCarthy and Zald (1973; 1977) have directed the 
attention of resource mobilization theories to resources mobilized from sources 
outside of social movements, i.e. from people who are not directly benefited by 
them. McCarthy and Zald, in particular, have implicitly recognized how important 
moral factors are to this process, calling these nonbeneficiaries "conscience" 
adherents of movements (1977).
Both organizational capacity and (collective) power-dependence relations 
are clearly external factors in the formation of revolutionary coalitions, i.e. 
factors outside the individual. Moral justification, on the other hand, may 
appear at first sight to be a factor internal to the individual. We do not 
believe this to be true. In fact, in the present paper we want to argue that 
personal beliefs in the moral justification of protest are neither necessary nor 
sufficient to mobilize a revolutionary coalition. In taking this position, we 
reason from two kinds of theory: First, from justice theory itself; second, from 
more general theories of legitimation.
Recent evidence offers good reason for preferring the theory of "distributive 
justice" to "equity theory" (Webster and Smith, 1978). The labels, of course are 
arbitrary and both theories are oriented to the same kinds of phenomena, but an 
essential feature of justice theory that differentiates it from equity theory is
that "reactions to injustice" depend on "referential" comparisons, i.e. comparisons 
with an externally created and maintained frame of reference. In this theory no 
individual can create a referential structure alone; referential structures are 
made up of generalized others and are external to any particular interaction.
The operation of such structures, furthermore, does not depend on any one 
individual's acceptance of their legitimacy. Many contemporary uses of Weber's 
theory of legitimacy tend to emphasize the voluntaristic features of his theory, 
hence the importance of consent; and consent is tacitly often taken to mean every 
particular individual's consent. But Weber himself held a much more complex and 
useful view. He defined legitimacy as the validity of a normative order (Weber, 
1978, Ch. 1, Sec. 5). Validity he defined as the "binding" quality of the order.
One consequence of validity, in this sense, he held to be the probability that a 
normative order would be supported. Given a valid normative order, motives of 
any particular individual for compliance might therefore be habit, expediency, or 
legitimacy (in the sense of personal acceptance of the normative order as right). 
More recently, Dornbusch and Scott (1968) have made more room for the attitudes 
of the powerless towards an order but like Weber, they continue to emphasize the 
importance of validity. They distinguish validity, the existence of a binding 
rule in a group, from propriety, the attitudes of any particular individual 
to that rule. As in Weber, the stability of a normative order does not require 
that every individual accept its legitimacy, reject the legitimacy of actions 
violating that order, accept the legitimacy of the system of authority enabling 
the order to mobilize member resources for purposes of enforcing it, or reject 
the legitimacy of a revolutionary coalition's claims to these resources. Validity 
creates support. Support provides resources required to enforce compliance with 
a normative order, hence creates expedient motives for compliance. The regularity o 
conduct thus produced may also induce habitual compliance.
Because not all individuals necessarily hold the same values and validity 
depends for its effect in part on support, Dornbusch and Scott also distinguish 
who initiates and supports a normative order by their resources and their relation 
to the individual taken as a point of reference. They make a point of the 
importance of authorization, i.e. of the values of centers of power that assure 
resources backing an order (Cf. Stinchombe, 1968, Ch. 4). But they also give a 
significant place to endorsement, i.e. the values and support of powerless 
individuals.
It follows from this theory that propriety alone is not sufficient to create 
a legitimate social order and in the absence of propriety a legitimate social 
order will still compel compliance. Hence, we must think of the legitimation of 
revolutionary coalitions as a collective, not an individual, process. If, for 
the moment, we think in terms of a simple Dornbusch-Scott model in which the 
allocative behavior of an authority, A, is authorized by those who have resources, 
A', and endorsed by subordinate actors (B's peers), B ׳, conditions do not favor 
forming a revolutionary coalition no matter how strong B's own sense of the 
inequity of the system. If, on the other hand, A 1 does not authorize A's conduct 
and B' does not endorse it, it is doubtful that B_' s personal sense that the 
behavior of A is right is sufficient to make it "legitimate". In other words, 
"legitimacy" might best be thought of as "right in the eyes of others." Looked 
at from the point of view of any particular individual, it is something that 
cannot be created alone.
The case in which A' authorizes A's conduct and this conduct is endorsed by 
B' almost guarantees the collapse of a revolutionary coalition, and it is this 
condition that has attracted the attention of Bacharach and Baratz, who describe 
its consequences as "nondecisionmaking." A nondecision is essentially a suppressed 
issue. It describes the nonacts of individuals who do nothing about an issue,
however deeply they may feel it. According to Bachrach and Baratz (1962; 1963;
1970) nondecisions are the product of the "mobilization of bias" (an expression 
taken from Schattschneider, 1960), i.e. of invoking the existing values, beliefs, 
rules, practices and procedures of a system which operate to delegitimate actors, 
issues, and tactics that threaten it. The effect of the mobilization of bias is 
to reduce the organizational capacity of a movement, deauthorizing its rights to 
make claims on individual-level resources, and to increase the readiness of 
authorized agents of the system to use organizational resources to repress the 
movement. Bachrach and Baratz's central position is that existing values, 
beliefs, rules, practices and procedures, hence existing institutional structures, 
shape what issues emerge and the form they take. (See Zelditch, el al, 1982, 
for a critical assessment of Bachrach and Baratz's theory.)
In part the effects of legitimacy are direct: What people see as proper, hence 
what alternatives are thinkable, is determined by the existing system's way of 
thought. In part the effects are indirect: Even if individual B does not believe 
what he sees and hears, the fact that others do lends it a facticity that makes it 
difficult to question, and an authorization and endorsement that makes questioning 
it both useless and inexpedient. There is also, of course, the effect this support 
has in legitimating the authority of A, which directly affects the conduct of B who 
anticipates how A will react if B tries to change an accepted system of values and 
norms. The effects of a moral order are more visible earlier in the policy process 
because legitimacy determines which issures emerge into the open in a group. 
Legitimacy, of course, is a factor in political struggles at every stage of policy 
formation. Propaganda routinely is directed at labelling issues and actors at the 
decision stage of the process in such a way that support for one side is increased 
or decreased. But the variance in legitimacy is nevertheless less for issues 
already in the political arena, because legitimacy is an important factor in
determining which issues emerge in the first place. There is less variance 
in the legitimacy of the contending actors, less variance in the legitimacy 
of the tactics employed, and less variance in the legitimacy of the issues 
contested. In a sense, both sides of an issue acceptable to a polity's agenda 
are more or less legitimate. Hence, the place to observe how legitimacy oper­
ates— according, still, to Bachrach and Baratz— is before agendas are set.
III. The Problem of a M ethod.
But "nondecisions" pose a nasty problem of method. They are the undecided 
issues of a polity, but there are an infinite number of things a polity does not 
decide, only some of which are suppressed issues. The others were never issues 
to begin with. The problem is to distinguish the nonissue from the suppressed 
issue. Bachrach and Baratz provided no independent test of issueness, i.e., of 
the intensity and/or scope of a population's preferences for change, hence were 
not able to empirically identify nondecisions. (See Frey, 1971; McFarland, 1969; 
Merelman, 1968; Wolfinger, 1971.) Nondecisions are essentially counter-factual 
agendas— issues that, in the absence of some countervailing factor would have 
been on a polity's agenda. What has to be shown is that, other things being 
equal, an issue would have emerged. The comparative method is the conventional 
solution to this problem. Comparing otherwise similar polities, a variable X_ can 
be said to cause a nondecision if and only if the issue is present when is 
absent. McFarland (1969) recognized this fairly quickly and his solution was 
quickly and brilliantly applied by Crenson (1971). But the complexity and multi­
colinearity of the variables correlated with issueness (Polsby, 1980, ch. 11) 
together with the difficulties of cross-level inferences about subjective per­
ceptions from aggregate-level objective measures (Snyder, 1979) have left serious 
problems of internal validity unsolved.
A method by which a more strict standard of internal validity can be achieved
is experimentation. By this method we can produce groups which are alike in the 
conditions believed to create an issue— which in this case is an inequality in 
the opportunity to win a bonus. We can randomize other factors relevant to the 
subjective definition of this issue. We can precisely isolate the effects of 
legitimation— in this case, the justification of inequality by reference to 
subject differences in ability. And we are in a good position to precisely 
measure both the behavior of the S's and their perceptions of the issues.
Before describing the design of this experiment, however, we want the 
reader to understand that, although it was designed with the above theoret­
ical ideas in mind, we fully expected to create equity not only in the aggregate 
but also in each individual. That is, the experiment was in fact designed to 
make inequality proper as well as valid. The idea was to fit this case into a 
larger program of other experiments in which validity was created but propriety 
was not (Walker, et a l , 1980; Thomas, et a l , 1980). Checks on the manipulation 
of the independent variable revealed that S's did not accept the equity of the 
reward system. Nevertheless, they formed significantly fewer revolutionary 
coalitions in the equity condition than in the inequity condition (which was 
originally designed merely as a baseline criterion that in fact an issue would 
have emerged had we not legitimated inequality). Hence, we created what Bachrach 
and Baratz mean by a nondecision without intending to do so. Most S's felt the 
situation to be improper but they did not act on that perception. Our problem is 
to find out, ex post facto, why they did not.
This gives a somewhat irregular organization to the paper: First we will 
demonstrate that, behaviorally, inequity produced significant differences in the 
frequency of revolutionary coalitions. Only then will we deal with the routine 
checks on the manipulation of the independent variable. Studying these checks, 
built into the post-session questionnaire, we will show that whatever produced
the behavior of the S's it was not the successful manipulation of equity. Third, 
we will study, in turn, three possible explanations of our result: We will show 
that it was not because we legitimated the other basic features of the structure 
of the group, which therefore resisted change. Although there are strong 
correlations in the post-session questionnaire data between approval of the 
group's structure and resistance to change, these are post-hoc. Nor was the 
result due to a conventionally conceived experimenter effect, i.e. by E directly 
signalling his hypothesis to S who, out of cooperative motives, confirmed E's 
hypothesis for him. Postexperimental inquiry (of the kind described by Orne,
1962) showed that either S's did not perceive E's hypothesis or were not reluctant 
to refute it to E's face. The effect, it will turn out, was due to a demand 
characteristic of the experimental setting, but of a somewhat special kind— a 
kind, we will argue, that is an example of the legitimation by a system of 
values, rules, and beliefs rather than of compliance to persons. We then use 
this finding to speculate about the collective nature of the process of legiti­
mation, i.e. about how validity works in the face of impropriety.
IV. Design of the Experiment.
Four subjects (S's) are seated in individual cubicles and told that they are 
part of a five-person group which must solve a series of ten problems. Each 
problem constitutes one trial of the experiment. Each S has some but no S has all 
of the information necessary to solve the problem. To get the answer each S 
exchanges information with each other member of the group by means of written 
memoranda. This exchange is limited in two ways: (1) only task-relevant infor­
mation can be exchanged, and (2) each S can communicate only with a limited 
number of others. Specifically, there is one central person, C (a confederate), 
who can communicate with everyone else; but all others can communicate only with 
C. (This is known as the "wheel" network— see Bavelas, 1950). By exchanging
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information with C, S's can get all the necessary information and solve each 
problem. The team as a whole is credited with 60c for each correct answer it 
submits to E's office. Team earnings are divided equally among the members at the 
end of the experiment.
After a practice problem subjects are told that in order to get them to work 
faster a bonus of $3.00 will be paid on each problem to the team member with the 
first correct answer. Because the communication system is centralized, the bonus 
will always go to C, the confederate, but a team is allowed to add more channels 
of communication if it is willing to pay a small cost, to be shared by all 
members (Mackenzie, 1976). An all-to-all network, for example, would equalize 
opportunity to win a bonus. Because the cost must be borne by all members, to 
add more channels a majority of the group must agree. S's are told that an 
"election" to decide the issue will be held by E if any member of the group (1) 
proposes a specific agenda and (2) obtains a second by one other member. Thus, 
from the point of view of the peripheral members, the problem is to mobilize the 
resources of his peers to accomplish a change that restores equity. No election 
is actually held: each S is stopped and interviewed at the point at which a 
proposal to change the structure is first made.
In the baseline, or inequity condition, the inequity of the bonus was 
underlined by telling S's early in their instructions that all of them were 
alike, had been allocated to positions in the communication network by chance, 
and would be given exactly the same amount of information to start with. In the 
equity condition, although S's were again told what they would all be given 
exactly the same amount of information, the center was differentiated from all 
other members. S's were told that:
״The members of your team are...similar in several ways.
For example, you are all similar in age, attend the same 
school, and are of the same sex. The position you occupy
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in the group, with the exception of the (center)1^ position 
was determined by chance. You will recall that when you 
came in you were asked to select one of four colored tokens.
The color of the token you selected determined whether your 
code color would be red, yellow, blue or green. For your 
group, however, we have specially selected the person who 
occupies the orange position. We have chosen a person for 
the orange position who is both experienced at the problems 
on which your group will be working and is very adept at the 
solution to these problems. In fact, the person who is orange 
in your group has demonstrated a performance level in the top 
1% of all the people who have worked on these problems over 
the past year and a half."
The dependent variable of the experiment consists of the trial at which a 
message is sent by S to any other member of the group proposing a change in the 
communication network. A  message proposing to rent one or more channels of 
communication is called a C-response (for "change-response").
V. Results.
(1) Behavioral Results. A  total of 52 paid undergraduate volunteers were 
randomly allocated to the equity or inequity conditions. Of these, 12 did not 
meet the initial conditions established before the experiment as minimally 
required to test its hypotheses. Four S's were suspicious— 3 of these in the 
inequity and 1 in the equity condition. They did not believe what they were 
told and showed in post-session interviews that they in fact acted on their 
suspicions early in the experiment. Four did not understand the instructions— 3 
in the inequity and 1 in the equity condition. They either did not understand 
how to rent more channels or other significant features of the instructions.
Finally, four of the remaining 44 S's made individualistic rather collective 
change-responses. They tried to directly negotiate with the center, or withhold 
information from the others, or send false information in order to make a change 
in the allocation of the bonus. For other purposes this would be an important 
behavior to analyze, but 3 of the four were in the inequity condition and hence 
do not bear on the hypothesis with which we are concerned in the present experiment.5
All four were therefore excluded from the analysis of the results. All these 
decisions had been pre-planned before the experiment was run, were common to 
all experiments in the same program, hence were made during the course of 
running the experiment before any hypotheses were tested or results examined. E 
continued to run S's until 20 good S's were obtained for each condition. The 
experiment was run at the same time as another 3-condition experiment on potential 
power, and in fact the inequity condition was also the baseline (or control) 
condition for the second of these experiments. S's were randomly allocated to 
one of the four conditions of these two experiments by E, and the two experiments 
shared the same staff— which, because one E was required to interview each S and 
often 4 S's were run at one time, was often quite large.
In the baseline condition of the experiment, 95% of the S's made a C-response 
at some time during the experiment (see table 1). From the perspective of the
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
present experiment, in which the real interest is in the equity condition, what 
this baseline measures is the magnitude of the pressure created by inequalities 
in the allocation of the bonus to change the structure of the communication 
network. Other things being equal, almost half the S's in the baseline condition 
have tried to get another member of the group to endorse a proposal to change the 
structure of the communication network by the end of the first trial of the 
experiment. By the end of the second trial, 70% have made such a C-response. By 
the tenth trial of the experiment, only one S had not made a C-response.
In the equity condition, on the other hand, only 60% of S's had made a 
C-response by the tenth trial of the experiment.
One way to measure the magnitude of the effect of making an inequality 
legitimate under the particular conditions created by this experiment is to 
compare the per cent of S's surviving at the tenth trial of the experiment. By
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this method, something like a third of the pressure to change the communication 
network in the baseline condition was reduced by telling S's that the center was 
especially able. The observed per cent of C-responses, however, is a seriously 
misleading statistic because it does not distinguish faster from slower rates of 
change. Two curves can have the same value at the tenth trial yet differ substan­
tially earlier in the experiment. Nor will the mean or median trial of the 
distribution of C-responses adequately represent the differences in the experience 
of the two conditions. Quite different curves can have the same mean and 
even the same median. The method recommended by medical researchers, who have 
the most experience with such curves, is therefore to display and compare the 
entire trial x trial experience of the S's. Figure 1 shows the distribution of 
such responses in the form of a survival curve, i.e. the per cent surviving at 
the end of each trial of the experiment (which is simply one minus the cumulative 
percentage of S's making a C-response at each trial, based on table 1).
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
A statistic that more precisely reflects the differences in shape of 
these two survival curves is based on the ratio of the relative rates of change 
in the equity treatment compared to its baseline condition, a statistic used to 
evaluate clinical trials in medical experiments. The essential idea in analyzing 
survival curves is that observed change at each trial is compared to expected 
change at each trial, which in turn depends only on the number of S's exposed to 
risk at the beginning of each trial. If m S's make a C-response at trial t and a 
proportion _p of all S's were in condition i when trial t began, the expected 
number of C-responses in condition i is pjm (assuming there is no true diff­
erence between conditions). The quantity O ^ / E { , the ratio of the observed to 
the expected number of change-responses, gives the relative rate of change in the 
ith condition, i.e, the rate of change in the ith condition compared to that in
the population as a whole. The quantity CR^1 = ( 0 / E ^ )/(Oj/E j) gives 
the ratio of the relative rate of change in the ith condition to that in the 
jth condition— reflecting the shape of the two curves because the expected 
values are computed trial by trial and are based on the numbers surviving 
up to the time each trial begins. The quantity SR^ = 1 - CR provides essen­
tially the same information, but has a more natural interpretation in the present 
case as the "suppression" rate, i.e., the rate at which change in the baseline is 
delayed or prevented by the equity treatment, and can be simply read "the percent 
of change in the baseline condition that is delayed or prevented by the treatment 
in the experimental condition." By this measure, the justification of inequity 
by E delayed or prevented 66% of the change found in the baseline condition 
(see Table 2).
The statistic (() - E)^/ e , furthermore, is distributed as chi square 
with (in this case) 1 df, which is the basis for the significance levels in table
2. A suppression ratio of 66% would have occurred by chance less than once in 
200 experiments. (For a comprehensive survey of methods of analyzing survival 
curves, see Elandt-Johnson and Johnson, 1980. An especially clear and nontechnical 
treatment, based on the nonparametric "logrank" statistic which is used here, can 
be found in Peto, et al., 1977.)
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
(2) Some Post-Session Questionnaire Results. Whatever it was that produced 
this effect, it was not our successful manipulation of equity. Table 3 shows the 
responses to five post-session questionnaire items that were used to check the 
manipulation. Four of the five items do not differ significantly by condition: 
Orange was thought about equally able in both conditions, both thought team 
earnings should be equally divided, both thought the bonus too high, and both 
thought E should change the communication network in future experiments. The
only item differentiating the two conditions is the third, appropriateness of 
the bonus. But even this item differs only marginally between conditions, 
the significant difference depending on just four S's in the equity condition who 
thought the bonus appropriate (i.e. who said either that the bonus was very 
appropriate or appropriate). In the post-session interview, S's explained their 
responses by (often spontaneously) offering that, although orange was very able 
the task was so simple that ability was irrelevant. Forty per cent of the S's 
said this before they were directly asked; 75% felt this to be true when asked 
directly. It is clear from these results that we did not establish the propriety 
of the experiment's rewards.
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
V I . Discussion
Although our manipulation of equity did not legitimate the experiment's 
reward system, it did legitimate the behavior of "orange" in the experiment, 
and hence the centrality of the communication network. S's in the equity 
condition were more likely than S's in the inequity condition to say that 
orange was "cooperative" (Tj= .31; t = 1.997; P <.05 (one-tailed). In both con­
ditions, orange took charge of coordinating the team's performance and there­
fore dominated interaction. In the equity condition this was made legitimate 
by orange's experience and ability. In a sense, E changed the meaning of 
orange's behavior by establishing these facts and backing them with E's 
authority.
For this and perhaps other reasons, S's in the equity condition were 
more likely also to approve the centralized structure of the communication 
network. Approval of the network was significantly correlated with how coopera­
tive S felt orange was (Pearson's r = .36; F = 5.66; P <.05) and significantly 
differentiated the two conditions (׳Y\ = .30; t = 1.95; P <.05 (one-tailed)). This
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may explain the differences in the survival curves of the two conditions. In the 
inequity condition, inequalities in the opportunity to win the bonus were clearly 
seen as causally linked to the inequity of the reward system and the illegitimacy 
of the bonus spread to the structure which S's changed in order to restore 
equity. In the equity condition, some S's at least evidently separated their 
disapproval of the bonus from their disapproval of the communication network. 
Separating the two parts of the inequitable structure meant essentially that S's 
faced a legitimation conflict. Part of the system (taken as a whole) was legiti­
mate and part was illegitimate. If in fact they felt such a conflict, we might 
expect them to be in three states at any given stage of the process: they could 
have resolved the conflict in favor of the communication network, resolved it in 
favor of a change, or they could have not yet resolved the conflict. We might 
assume that the observable behavior of the S's correlates with these three 
states: If S has resolved the conflict in favor of change S should make a 
C-response, and otherwise not.
The shape of the survival curve in the equity condition suggests that 
if there is such a conflict it is resolved fairly early. One way to describe 
this curve is to divide it at the point of inflection, which is at the fifth 
trial, into two populations. One of the two populations makes a C-response 
quite early in the experiment (or at least within its first half). The other 
never makes a C-response. Both the cooperativeness of orange and approval 
of the communication network are correlated with these responses. Believing 
orange is very cooperative or cooperative delays or prevents 56% of the change 
taking place among all other subjects ( X ^  = 5.52; P <.05). Approving the 
communication network (i.e. the 1 and 2 responses) delays or prevents 71% of 
the changing taking place among all other subjects (1C 2 = 6.26; P <.05).
(Both these computations are based on all 40 S's.)
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There is, however, one obvious difficulty with this explanation of the 
differences between the two survival curves. The post-session questionnaire 
data is obtained after the behavior it is supposed to describe. The entire 
interpretation could well be post h o c . It is based on assuming that if approval 
and C-responses are correlated, the causal order is initiated by approval.
In the case of the equity condition (but not in the inequity condition), it is 
possible to check this assumption because S's were also asked their opinions 
of the communication network after a practice trial but before the bonus manipu­
lation. Measures of approval taken before the critical trials do not correlate 
with approval measured in the post-session questionnaire (Pearson's r = .24;
F = 0.94; n.s.) and delay or prevent only 11% of the change among those who do 
not approve the communication network (~)L 2 = 0.03; n.s.). This led us to 
doubt that legitimation conflict explains our results. A later experiment by 
Thomas, et al (1981) directly tested the hypothesis that post-session approval 
of the communication network is after the fact of the behavior it justifies 
by measuring half of the S's before and half of the S's after the bonus mani­
pulation and correlating the two measures with the post-session responses.
Where change is prevented, S's initially disapprove the communication network 
(quite strongly) but by the end of ten trials they approve about as strongly as 
they had approved before the bonus manipulation. Presumably they are justifying 
to themselves the behavior they exhibited in the experiment.
A plausible alternative hypothesis is that E somehow signalled his or 
her hypothesis to S who, desiring to be cooperative, confirmed it for E. The 
search for such a signal should be simplified by the fact that the only sources 
of variation in the experiment are the equity manipulation and the short question­
naire given after the practice trial. Everything else was standardized, video­
taped, and common to both conditions. Even though the manipulation of the
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independent variable did not produce its intended effect, it must still (with the 
short questionnaire that is associated with it) be the cause of the unintended 
experimenter effect.
However, it is well-known that the cues given off by E are often so subtle 
that they cannot be detected by an outside observer even though they can be 
detected by S. S is an active, hypothesis-forming animal, using the totality of 
cues in the experimental setting in forming a hypothesis about what is going on, 
and is not content to use only E's instructions. These cues range from rumors 
about the experiment before S enters the laboratory to the social attributes of E 
(race, sex, age, ...), E's personal characteristics (warmth, excitement, nervous­
ness, ...), paralinguistic cues (pitch, emphasis, tone, ...), kinesic cues 
(posture, expression, ...), and the procedures of the experiment (tests, intervals 
between tests, strength of the treatments, ...). (Cf Orne, 1962, Adair, 1973; 
Rosenthal, 1966; Rosenberg, 1965). Hence, one cannot assume from a study of the 
questionnaire or the instructions of the experiment that there were no experimenter 
effects. To try to discover whether our result was an experimenter effect, 
therefore, we must resort to some other method. Although we did not fully carry 
out the post-experimental inquiry recommended by Orne (1962), we were able to 
infer something from our post-session interviews about (a) what S's motives in 
the experiment were and (b) what S thought E's hypothesis was.
The literature on the social psychology of the experiment suggests two 
common motives: the desire to cooperate, to help E (Orne, 1962; Rosenthal, 1966) 
and the desire to look good, i.e. to look intelligent, honest, and autonomous to 
E (Rosenberg, 1965; see also Schulman, 1967). If S is cooperative, S should be 
more likely to confirm E's hypothesis if S knows what the hypothesis is, hence 
one method of detecting an experimenter effect is to correlate post-session 
statements about E's hypothesis with behavior in the experiment. If S is
apprehensive about E's evaluation— for example, if the effect of the short 
questionnaire in the equity condition was to differentially signal S that E was 
"testing" S— then his conduct in the experiment depends a great deal on the 
nature of E's hypothesis, but in general it has been found that S will try to 
look honest, intelligent, and autonomous even if this disconfirms E's hypothesis. 
(Cf the discussion in Adair, 1973, ch 3)
The evidence of the post-session interviews suggests that S's were more 
apprehensive about E's evaluations than cooperative. Asked in post-session 
interviews how E's mention of orange's ability affected them when they answered 
the post-session questionnaire item about the appropriateness of the bonus, 70% 
of the S's in the equity conditioned denied that orange's ability was relevant to 
them. Asked how E's mention of orange's ability affected their decision to rent 
or not to rent more channels of communication, 70% denied they had taken orange's 
ability into account. Either they did not suspect what E's hypothesis was or 
they were not cooperative at this stage of the experiment. There was no diffe­
rence between those who did and those who did not deny the relevance of orange's 
ability in actual behavior during the experiment = 1.92; n.s.).
These responses, of course, are consistent with the idea that S's wanted to 
look autonomous and independent in E's eyes, and the fact that the short question­
naire given after the practice trial was given in the equity but not the inequity 
condition is consistent with the hypothesis that it raised apprehensions about 
evaluation differentially in the two conditions. The difficulty with this 
hypothesis is that if the short questionnaire had had this effect during the 
experiment it would have increased, not decreased the rate of C-responses in the 
equity condition. In any case, there was no correlation between the strength of 
S's expressed autonomy during the post-session interview and his behavior in the 
experiment. Every S in the interview (except for two for whom the tapes were
blank) either denied the relevance of E's hypothesis when directly asked or 
spontaneously offered that orange's ability was irrelevant because the task was 
so simple. But some did both while others did only one of the two. If we assume 
that doing both is stronger than doing only one or the other, a logrank analysis 
of the C-responses of the two groups shows no difference between them =
0.30, n.s.). On the whole, we do not think the result of our experiment was due 
to S's efforts to confirm E's hypothesis.
But S's obviously did detect something in E 's behavior that differentiated 
their own behavior in the experiment. The only question, really, is what? One 
alternative to experimenter bias is that we obtained something more like a 
control effect produced by the demand characteristics of the experiment. In the 
literature on demand characteristics, it is important to distinguish the effects 
of performance cues, which signal E's hypothesis, from role definitions, which 
define for S the proper role of a subject in an experiment and the relation the 
subject is expected to have to others in the experiment, in particular to E.
The more striking instances of a demand characteristic have to do not with 
experimenter effects in the sense of performance cues but rather with the very 
high degree of control an E is capable of exerting in an experimental setting. 
Orne, trying to find a task that S's would refuse to do because it was either 
painful or meaningless, was never able to find one. S's worked more than five 
hours on such meaningless tasks as adding columns of figures from a pile of 2000 
sheets, even when instructed to tear each sheet up after the additions had been 
completed. Much earlier, Frank had already shown that S's would perform such 
equally meaningless tasks as balancing a marble on a steel ball or eating a dozen 
unsalted soda crackers for no discernible reason. In these cases, what E is 
doing has nothing to do with cueing E's hypothesis. What is happening is simply 
that E's authority, accepted by S as legitimate, leads S to do anything S is
asked to do, however pointless it appears to S. Orne uses the expression 
"demand characteristics" to refer to both performance cues and role defini­
tions (1962). But the bulk of the literature on the subject is about performance 
cues only (Rosenthal, 1966; Rosenberg, 1965). In the present experiment there is 
little evidence of bias due to performance cues. But it is nevertheless possible 
that we have found a control result instead.
S's enter the experimental situation usually with cooperative motives 
and the desire to look good to E (although occasionally negativistic motives are 
found— see Adair, 1973 ch 3, for a discussion of these). Even where, as in the 
present experiment, we do not find S's "cooperating" in the sense of trying to 
confirm E's hypothesis, they still almost invariably want to be a "good S" in the 
larger sense of playing the role as it is supposed to be played. Demand charac­
teristics, i.e. the totality of cues the experimental situation presents to S, 
create a framework of social knowledge and interpretation that provide S with 
some ideas of how they are expected to act in an experiment and how others will 
act in an experiment (e.g. E, E's assistants, other S's). But S actually comes 
to the experiment with some rules already formed, particularly rules defining the 
authority of E, that are understood by S before any demand characteristics begin 
to function. On the basis of these preexisting conceptions of the role of an S, 
together with demand characteristics in the experimental setting, more concrete 
and specific rules emerge in the particular experiment. These emergent rules are 
different in character from E's hypothesis. In a sense, they are not about 
what the experiment is about, its purpose, E's cognitive assumptions, etc.
They are about what the proper conduct of an S is about. But, like performance 
cues, it is to E that S looks to provide cues about the norms governing what an S 
is to do in what is to S a novel situation. E is the only source available for 
such information. To the extent that S cares to be "a good S " , it is E who molds
S's conception of the S-role in the experiment. Any act is understood by both E 
and S to be proper if S does the task E requires in the way E requires him/her to 
do it.
The pre-existing rules that define the structure of the E-S relation 
are based on the beliefs S's who volunteer for experiments have about science. 
Despite the experience of the sixties, all the S's in this experiment believed 
the goals of science to be legitimate. They believed, furthermore, that E 
believed in these goals. What S does in an experiment is justified by the joint 
commitment of E and S to these goals and by the relevance of what is done in the 
experiment to them. These goals are taken for granted by E and S in the same way 
that both take for granted E's superior, expert knowledge, the goodness of his 
intentions, and the inferior, naive state of S's own knowledge of whatever it is 
E is doing. It is out of this relation that the emergent rules of the situation 
arise. But what E is creating, in this instance, is not knowledge of E's hypothe­
sis, but rather the validity of the social structure created by the experiment.
This analysis, incidentally, is not as post hoc as it sounds. It was, in 
fact, made before the experiment and was the basis for designing and carrying out 
several other experiments on the effects of legitimacy on collective action (see 
particularly Thomas, et a l , 1980). Throughout, demand characteristics were used 
to create miniaturized legitimation processes in the laboratory. But the question 
nevertheless arises whether this analysis has any real application in the present 
experiment.
Our interpretation of what happened in this experiment is that E created a 
valid framework of interpretation (in the Dornbusch-Scott Sense) for what S could 
expect in the experiment, S used this framework to interpret what went on, and 
the validity of this framework operated to legitimate some kinds of actions and 
deligitimate other kinds of actions whether or not S personally felt them to
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be proper. Any particular act is legitimate if and only if it is in accord 
with rules that are in some sense accepted or acceptable. The legitimacy 
of acts, of course, is something distinct from the legitimacy of the rules 
themselves (cf Rawls, 1955). In any concrete case, saying that an act is or is 
not legitimate in fact makes a judgment about both acts and rules. The rules 
themselves are legitimate either if they follow from other accepted rules or they 
are deducible from a combination of values and beliefs that are accepted or 
acceptable. The vagueness with which we say "accepted or acceptable" is intention­
al: If values, rules, and beliefs are accepted by a particular individual, say 
p , i.e. if they are just, moral, and right in that particular individual's own 
view, we assume that there is no pressure from p to change them. However, if 
they are improper, if p does not accept them as right, and the situation in 
which p is located is one that requires concerted, collective action, while p 
may personally feel some pressure to change the rules, whether p does or does 
not in fact act on this feeling depends on the validity of the rules, not their 
propriety. If the rules p feels should be changed are valid, and/or if the 
rules p believes are proper are invalid, collective action will collapse 
even if the strength of the prospective change-oriented coalition is sufficient 
to accomplish the change p desires (cf Michener and Lyons, 1972).
In the present experiment, S believes that E believes that the system 
of rewards is equitable in the equity condition but not in the inequitable 
condition. This is communicated quite clearly in the instructions. Even 
if the equity manipulation does not succeed in persuading S of the propriety of 
the system, it nevertheless tells S that _E believes in it. And E is the chief 
source of the emergent values, beliefs, rules, practices and procedures that 
define S's conduct in experiments. We may therefore say that the reward system 
is valid in the equity condition and invalid in the inequity condition. We
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assume that any act of S's is legitimate (to S) if and only if it accords with 
valid values, beliefs, rules, practices and procedures in the situation of S's 
action, i.e. the experimental situation. But what we are concerned with in the 
present experiment is collective action. Our reasoning may not hold for discre­
tionary actions of individuals (for example, reallocating rewards when in a 
position to do so), but to the extent that what S is required to do requires 
joint action with others, we assume that legitimacy means that the acts accord 
with valid values, beliefs, rules, practices and procedures. Put another 
way, they do not depend on propriety. Propriety by itself cannot create validity, 
which is an aggregate, a collective property. Personal acceptance by p is in an 
obvious sense different from acceptance by a group. It is in this sense that we 
want to argue that validity is a collective, not an individual-level process.
Can we say more? We have so far asserted that if S believes that E believes 
that the reward system is equitable in the equity condition, then the reward 
system is valid, even if not proper. In the inequity condition it is neither 
valid nor proper. The experiment, given these terms of reference, shows that 
C-responses depend on validity, independent of propriety. But how exactly does 
validity produce this effect? Here we admit to being on very tenuous ground.
Our conclusion will depend on the reader agreeing with the following starting 
point: We can think of four ways in which validity might produce compliance.
These are (1) validity may directly increase voluntary compliance by S because it 
provides the only available publicly acceptable account for action in the experi­
ment. (Scott and Lyman, 1968), (2) Validity may indirectly increase voluntary 
compliance by increasing the likelihood that S feels a rule to be proper. If 
propriety is consistent with validity, compliance should be increasingly likely 
and increasingly likely to be voluntary. (3) Validity may indirectly increase 
involuntary compliance by increasing S's anticipation that other S's will endorse
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the reward system and, hence, will not join in collective action to change it. 
Efforts to change the system will therefore appear futile. (4) Finally, validity 
may also indirectly increase involuntary compliance by increasing S's anticipation 
that E, because E is authorizing the system, will back it by sanctions.®
Only the first of these seems to us plausible in the case of the present 
experiment. Any effect through propriety is ruled out by the evidence of the 
checks on the manipulation. These show that few S's believed in the propriety of 
the reward system. Endorsement is a very plausible hypothesis, and Michener and 
Lyons (1972) showed that one of the chief effects of their equity manipulation 
was on the expectations of S that others would support revolutionary coalitions.
In the present experiment, S's expectation that others approve or do not approve 
the bonus is very highly correlated with their own approval (Pearson's r =
.79; F = 60.37; P <.01), making it difficult to distinguish the effects of 
the two. Employing only other's approval, however, we find no significant 
effect on the distribution of C-responses (Logrank 'Y, 2 =  .75; n.s.). Thus, the 
externality at work in the experiment is located in E, not other S's. (This, of 
course, is due largely to the restricted communication network.)
But the post-session interview analysis shows that it is not really E's 
sanctions that, anticipated by S, determine S's responses. Or, to the extent 
that S is apprehensive about evaluations by E what this does is make S want to 
appear more autonomous. While we concede that the argument is highly inferential, 
if we must choose one of the four ways in which validity operated to produce a 
nondecision in the present experiment we conclude that collective action collapsed 




"Equity theory" refers here to the theories of Adams (1963, 1965), Blau 
(1964), Homans (1974), and Walster, Walster and Berscheid (1978), i.e. 
to exchange theories of distributive justice.
See particularly Hoffman, et a l , 1954; Lawler, 1975; Messe, et al 1975; 
Michener and Lawler, 1971; Michener and Lyons, 1972; and Webster and 
Smith, 1978.
It may seem far-fetched to support the idea that legitimacy is important 
in natural revolutionary coalitions by appeal to a literature in which, 
although the importance of legitimacy may be intuitively obvious, it is 
not treated as an analytically separable factor in the process of mobili­
zing movement organizations. Tilly (1978), Obershall (1973), and McCarthy 
and Zald (1977) either do not treat legitimacy as theoretically signif­
icant at all or treat it merely as one kind of resource. Nevertheless, 
the recent literature on social movements, which has tended to be dom­
inated by resource mobilization theory, amply justifies giving a central 
place in the analysis to legitimacy (of which equity is one kind). In 
of this work, and particularly Tilly (1969; 1970; 1975; 1978) and Gamson 
(1975), it is the legitimacy of actors and tactics that distinguishes 
outsiders' politics from insiders' politics, hence "social movements" 
from "interest groups" and violent from peaceful politics. The liter­
ature on natural revolutionary coalitions does suggest the importance of 
more kinds of legitimation than the equity literature does: it turns on 
the legitimation of actors, tactics, and the jurisdictions claimed by 
groups, as well as issues (where equity is more directly relevant).
But legitimacy is repeatedly at issue in this literature, and essentially 
it is what the political struggle described by Tilly is about. Tangential 
to this literature, but also significant for our purposes, is the evidence, 
from the literature on revolutionary coalitions in natural situations, 
that an important part of the dynamic of "retaliation" against revolu­
tionary coalitions depends on the perceived legitimacy or illegitimacy 
of "protest" (Turner, 1969, Parker & Lauderdale, 1980).
All positions in the communication network were color-coded. The central 
position was coded "orange" in all groups. The word "orange" appeared at 
this point in the instructions.
These individualistic responses are included, however, in Zelditch, et a l , 
1981, which is concerned with both individual and collective responses.
jC.jl. stands for "change ratio."
S.R. stands for "suppression ratio."
We omit the direct effect of E's authority because E does not directly 
command S's to change the structure in the inequity condition nor/to 
change it in the equity condition of this experiment.
Table 1. Percent of subjects making a change-response by trial and condition
Trial Number
Cond it ion N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total
Inequity 20 45 25 10 10 0 0 0 5 0 0 95%
Equity 20 5 5 30 15 0 5 0 0 0 0 60%
Table 2. Logrank statistic of the relative rate of change in the equity condi 











Inequity 20 19 10.83 1.75
Equi ty 20 12 20.17 0.60
All 40 31 31.00 1.00
*The ratio of the relative rates of change, 34%, indicates that the equity 
manipulation delayed or prevented 66% of the change taking place in the 
inequity condition. ()¿2 = 9.47; p < .005).
Table 3 Post session questionnaire responses used to check the Manipulation 




(1) How would you rate the ability 
of Orange at solving problems? 





0.49 n . s .
(2) How appropriate do you believe 
it is to divide team earnings 
equally?





-0.38 n . s .
(3) How appropriate do you believe 
it is to award a bonus to the 
first team member who submits 
the correct answer?






(4) In general, how do you feel 
about the amount of the 
bonuses?





-0.83 n . s .
(5) How desirable do you think it 
is to change the communication 
network for future studies?





-0.12 n. s .
*One-tailed probabilities (that Orange is more able in the equity condition, that 
equal division is less appropriate, that the bonus is more appropriate, the 
amount is not too high, and it is less desirable to change the communication 
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Figure 1. Percent of Subjects surviving at trial t by condition
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